The gap between exaggeration and belittlement

M. Bitar, g. Banna:

X-Men's 'sexualised' Muslim hero redesigned by comic fan | SBS News     Since its birth in the late 1920s, and after the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate, the political Islamic movement has sought to draw an idealized, imaginary, and glorifying image of this Caliphate, Thus, political Islam justified the demand to revive the extinct Caliphate, at least in its last Ottoman form, In their arguments and literature, this Ottoman Caliphate represented the faithful father of Islam, The House of Osman was a strong Islamic pillar…conquest…occupation, and a sultanic centralism with a precise and extreme application of the models of Arab religious caliphate rule.

Within the framework of that glorifying awareness of the Ottoman Caliphate, the Arab component accepted the formula of the orphan, who found in Ottoman paternalism a nurturer and refuge, especially after the application of the Millet system, which secured for the overwhelming majority, i.e. the Sunnis, a dominant position compared to the rest of the sects, which had to be satisfied with lower positions, Thus, the Ottomans divided society vertically into sects, and horizontally into distinct categories with varying degrees of rights and duties. The Sunni majority had the upper hand, which dominated the subjugated from the other sects, and thus, in the view of the majority, the concepts of sectarian equity were achieved as a form parallel to democracy.
The lesson and the problem now is the transfer of the concepts of sectarian equity, vertically and horizontally, to the present, and the consideration of the dominant majority’s departure from the hands of power as a betrayal of democracy and tampering with it, despite the fact that “democracy” is a concept that has no relation to the society of sects, but rather to the political society that secondarily bears the formula of the sects of society as an affiliation lower than the national political affiliation that is represented by political groups and parties.
In 1923, Ataturk abolished the Caliphate and drew inspiration from the West for administrative systems. Turkey began building the modern state, which separated religion from the state and abolished the millet system, thus achieving equality among citizens. He confined religion and its men to the monasteries and locked the door on them, Thus, Ataturk ended centuries of the millet system and the Ottoman Sultanate system and turned religious affiliation into a secondary affiliation, Thus, the ailing Turkey recovered. In contrast, Arab societies and peoples were afflicted with the Ottoman disease and opened the door wide to religion and its men and applied the principles of the Ottoman millet, which were manifested constitutionally in many articles…the religion of the head of state and the religion of the state, then the personal status laws…etc.
Nationalist movements, in partnership with Islamic movements, began the fragmentation process resulting from the millet system under the banner of unity, then backwardness under the banner of progress and backwardness under the banner of modernity… until the state that the Allies presented to these peoples, for example, Sykes-Picot Syria, turned into fragments and ruins, and thus the state projects turned into pre-state achievements… Whoever compares Turkey today with the sum of the Arab states will find that the Turkish patient recovered from the Ottoman disease, and the Arab patient died because of the Ottoman disease.
The modern form of Ataturk’s secular state was characterized by the state’s authority over society and by distancing society from the authority of the state, authority, or person. Thus, the conditions for modern change in Ataturk’s Turkey were achieved. In contrast, the concept of the state’s authority over society was met with the obstacle of political Islam movements, which adopted the caliphate system that they had previously glorified and turned into a model and ideal.
Turkey generally disavowed Ottomanism and hanged many Ottomans accused of genocide in Istanbul after the end of World War I. In contrast, Islamists became more attached to Ottomanism, primarily out of fear for their privileges, which were threatened by political practices similar to those of Ataturk. They wanted to establish a kind of heritage of national social relations, where citizenship does not form the core of its consciousness, but rather utilitarianism through its dominant centrality over the margins, i.e., the minorities.

Political Islam seeks to “religiousize” politics and “politicize” religion. It does not represent a movement for social development and positive change, and therefore cannot be revolutionary or revolutionary, It exploits religion and intrudes upon politics to establish a “state of power” and obstruct the establishment of “state authority.” A state of power is capable of eliminating citizenship, politics, and the state itself. A state of power is inherently dictatorial, and thus represents a crippled or regressive state that will ultimately perish.

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